Cost recovery of RES-E support in Italy : a new case for a carbon tax by VERDE, Stefano F. & PAZIENZA, Maria Grazia
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RSCAS 2013/72 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Climate Policy Research Unit 
Cost recovery of RES-E support in Italy: 
A new case for a carbon tax 
 
Stefano F. Verde and Maria Grazia Pazienza 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
European University Institute 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
Climate Policy Research Unit 
 
 
 
Cost recovery of RES-E support in Italy: 
A new case for a carbon tax 
 
  
 Stefano F. Verde and Maria Grazia Pazienza 
 
EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2013/72 
 
 
  
This text may be downloaded only for personal research purposes. Additional reproduction for other 
purposes, whether in hard copies or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s).  
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper, or other series, the year and the publisher. 
 
 
 
ISSN 1028-3625 
© Stefano F. Verde and Maria Grazia Pazienza, 2013 
Printed in Italy, September 2013 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), created in 1992 and directed by Brigid 
Laffan since September 2013, aims to develop inter-disciplinary and comparative research and to 
promote work on the major issues facing the process of integration and European society. 
The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major research programmes and 
projects, and a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research agenda is organised 
around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration and the expanding membership of the European Union.  
Details of the research of the Centre can be found on:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/ 
Research publications take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers, Distinguished Lectures and 
books. Most of these are also available on the RSCAS website:  
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Publications/ 
The EUI and the RSCAS are not responsible for the opinion expressed by the author(s).  
Climate Policy Research Unit 
The Climate Policy Research Unit (CPRU) is a research group within the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies under the Loyola de Palacio Chair. The goal of the CPRU is to provide a reliable 
source for information and analysis of EU climate policy and a forum for discussion of research 
carried out in this area among government officials, academics and industry. 
The CPRU was established in 2010 at the initiative of Josep Borrell, former President of the EUI and 
former President of the European Parliament, as a means of providing more focus to European climate 
policy developments. The director of the CPRU is Denny Ellerman, part-time professor at the RSCAS, 
and recently retired as a Senior Lecturer from MIT's Sloan School of Management. The CPRU works 
in collaboration with the energy and regulatory policy research groups of the Florence School of 
Regulation and Loyola de Palacio Chair and with the Global Governance Programme at the EUI. 
Starting in 2012, the CPRU has been funded primarily by the European Commission (DG Climate 
Action).  
The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not represent the views of the 
European University Institute or any of its subsidiary components or those of the European 
Commission. 
For more information:  
http://fsr.eui.eu/CPRU/Index.aspx 

  
Abstract 
Using household survey data, we investigate the distributional incidence of the A3 surcharge, which 
recovers the cost of RES-E support in Italy. The surcharge is found to be markedly regressive. The 
fairness of such a system is questionable as RES-E support is justified by public policy objectives. We 
thus consider a carbon tax as an alternative means for recovering the cost of RES-E support. The 
literature suggests that energy is a less necessary good than electricity, typically because motor fuel 
consumption more closely follows income than electricity consumption does. If so, a carbon tax would 
be less regressive than the A3. Our findings confirm this. Also, the cost of the carbon tax would be 
more evenly distributed, because its base is diversified. Furthermore, different economic and climatic 
conditions mean the A3 and the hypothesized carbon tax impact differently across regions. The impact 
of the A3 is about twice as big for southern regions compared to northern ones, while the carbon tax 
would impact similarly across the country. A reform that replaces the A3 with a carbon tax a) has no 
cost, b) achieves greater equity, and c) involves tax earmarking. These three elements should help 
making it accepted by the public. 
Keywords 
RES-E support, Carbon tax, Distributional effects. 
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1. Introduction 
Under the Climate and Energy Package, the EU is committed to binding targets for greenhouse gas 
emissions and renewable energy.1 A 20% reduction in emissions, from the 1990 level, and 20% of 
renewable energy in total energy consumption are the EU’s “20-20” targets for 2020. The EU 
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which puts a cap on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions of the 
largest energy consuming industries, is the prime instrument for achieving the emission reduction 
target. At the national level, feed-in tariffs, feed-in premiums, tradable green certificates, tender 
systems, tax benefits and public funds are used to incentivise renewable energy sources (RES). 
Following the economic crisis, which took hold in Europe just before the Package came into force, in 
2009, the EU ETS and RES support have had so far opposite destinies: while the price of CO2 in the 
EU’s carbon market progressively tumbled, RES support, especially support to renewable electricity 
(RES-E), has reached significant levels in many Member States (MSs). 2 
By definition, RES support in the form of tax benefits and public funds weighs on the government 
budget. However, RES-E support in Europe is principally carried out through feed-in tariffs, green 
certificates and tender systems, which in the vast majority of MSs are paid by electricity consumers.3 
Specifically, the costs of feed-in tariffs and public tenders are directly recovered through surcharges, 
while the cost of green certificates is transferred from conventional generators to consumers via the 
wholesale and retail markets. In either case, making consumers pay is questionable from the 
standpoint of fairness. Electricity is indeed a necessity good par excellence. Therefore, contributions 
proportional to consumption are regressive across households; that is, in relative terms, the burden 
declines with rising income. At the same time, RES support is motivated by public policy objectives, 
notably environmental protection, technology innovation, energy security and employment. As such, 
the cost should be covered by the government budget (Chawla and Pollitt [2013]). In that case, 
assuming that the general tax system reflects society’s preference concerning equity, the problem of 
regressiveness would not arise. Similarly, energy intensive productions would not be penalised any 
more than others. 
There are different reasons, however, for which RES support, in Europe, is largely paid by 
consumers. First and foremost, the existing constraints on public finances do not leave margins for 
ambitious new government expenditure programs. Secondly, as not directly dependent on future 
budgetary decisions, surcharges and green certificates (with a minimum guaranteed price) have the 
advantage of providing higher investment security (Neuhoff et al. [2013]). Moreover, both with 
surcharges and green certificates, consumer prices are higher (than they would be without) and this 
promotes energy efficiency (Koutstaal et al. [2009]). In view of these considerations, a general shift of 
the burden from consumers to the government (i.e., from surcharges to taxes) is unlikely, at least in the 
near future. Still, a system for allocating costs more equitably is much needed.  
With reference to Germany’s main RES-E support mechanism, Neuhoff et al. (2013) note that 
many industry consumers are exempt from the relative surcharge and that, therefore, the burden could 
be redistributed by removing at least part of those exemptions. This option, which highlights a trade-
                                                     
1 The Climate and Energy Package consists of six legislative texts: a Directive (29/2009) revising the EU ETS; a Decision 
(406/2009) setting national targets for CO2 emissions from the non-ETS sector; a Directive (28/2009) setting national 
targets for RES in the energy mix; a Directive (31/2009) creating a legal framework for carbon capture and storage; a 
Regulation (443/2009) setting standards for CO2 emissions from new cars; a Directive (30/2009) revising the Fuel 
Quality Directive.  
2 A useful classification of RES-E support mechanisms is found in EWEA (2012). On the rationale(s) for RES-E support, 
as a complement to the EU ETS, see Lehman and Gawel (2013). For a discussion of price versus quantity mechanisms, 
see Menanteau et al. (2003). 
3 CEER (2012) shows that this is the case for 20 of the 22 MSs therein considered. 
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off between competitiveness and equity objectives, is being debated in Germany and is valid for other 
countries too. Given rising electricity prices in Spain, Batlle (2011) proposed a more elaborate 
alternative whereby the total cost of RES support is spread over all final fuel consumers in proportion 
to consumption. The author demonstrates that, as the EU target is for all RES energy, it would be both 
cost-effective, towards the achievement of the target, and equitable, across consumption of different 
fuels, to charge all forms of non-renewable energy. 
In recent years, Italy has provided a striking example of rapidly rising RES-E investment and 
growing cost of the relative incentives. Different RES-E promotion schemes have been in operation, 
the costs of which are largely recovered through a specific surcharge called “Componente tariffaria 
A3” (A3). In the space of only few years, the rates of the A3 (c€/KWh), which vary both by user and 
consumption level, have gone from being negligible to sizable. Primarily due to the feed-in tariffs for 
photovoltaics, which saw an unprecedented investment boom in 2011, they have grown by more than 
a hundredfold between 2008 and 2013. At the time of writing (June 2013), the A3 has come to 
represent about 17% of the price paid by the average household. 
Dealing with the Italian case, this work contributes to the emerging debate, in Europe, on cost 
allocation of RES-E support and the more general question of equity in the energy transition. Our 
analysis has two main objects. First, we assess the distributional incidence of the A3 on household 
budgets. Using micro-data from the 2011 Italian household expenditure survey, we estimate the cost of 
the A3 across income distribution. The household sector is segmented in total expenditure deciles, but 
intra-decile variation is accounted for too. Second, we examine the option of a carbon tax as a means 
for recovering the cost of RES-E support alternative to electricity surcharges. Our presumption, 
supported by the evidence of many empirical studies (e.g., Ekins et al. [2011], Callan et al. [2009], 
Tiezzi [2005], Barker and Kohler [1998]), is that motor fuel consumption increases with rising income 
more than home fuel consumption does. If so, recovering the costs of RES-E support through a carbon 
tax, which hits all fossil fuels, would be less regressive than it currently is with electricity surcharges. 
Using the same data, we thus simulate the distributional impact of a carbon tax equivalent in yield to 
the A3. Since both climatic and economic conditions vary significantly across Italy, thereby affecting 
the impacts of the carbon tax and the A3, the analysis conducted for the country is then replicated for 
three macro-regions. 
Cingano and Faiella (2013) already showed that a carbon tax on motor fuels could replace the more 
regressive A3, given the different patterns of electricity and gasoline consumption across income 
distribution. We envisage a carbon tax that applies to all fossil fuels, which has further implications. A 
carbon tax on all fossil fuels, as opposed to only motor fuels, gives consumers more opportunities for 
behavioural change. Also, as motor fuels in Italy are already heavily taxed, spreading the burden over 
all fuels would be both more cost-effective (toward emission abatement) and politically practicable. 
More generally, we put forward the idea that the extension of carbon pricing to the non-EU ETS 
sector, recommended on the ground of cost-effectiveness, could also make the cost recovery of RES 
support less regressive, if the proceeds were used for that purpose. Not least, a fairer distribution of 
costs and tax earmarking should help a great deal to make the reform accepted.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the recent development of renewable 
electricity in Italy as well as the support schemes underpinning it. Section 3 illustrates the A3, with 
respect to its rates, how they evolved over time and how this evolution is reflected in the structure of 
retail prices. Section 4 estimates the incidence of the A3 across income distribution and compares it to 
that of a carbon tax, both at the national level and for three macro-regions. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. The progression of renewable electricity 
2.1 Installed capacity and generation 
Under the EU Renewable Energy Directive (28/2009), Italy must produce renewable energy for an 
amount equal to 17% of total energy consumption, by 2020. The National Renewable Energy Action 
Plan (NREAP) breaks down this target into three non-binding sub-targets, one for each of the 
following sectors: electricity, heating/cooling and transport. Most efforts, thus far, have been spent in 
supporting renewable electricity. In 2012, RES-E generation reached 27% of electricity consumption, 
less than 2 percentage points short of the relative NREAP target (28.9%).  
Different technologies contributed in different proportions to the progression of RES-E generation. 
It is apparent from Figure 1 that the period 2008-2009 was characterised by a sizeable increase in 
electricity produced by hydro power plants – an increase mostly due to more favourable weather 
conditions. The trend between 2010 and 2012, by contrast, was driven primarily by the investment 
boom in photovoltaics. “Boom” is not an overstatement: in 2011, newly installed photovoltaic 
capacity amounted to 9.3 GW, the world record that year. Figure 2 shows the patterns of cumulated 
capacity, by RES-E technology. Photovoltaic capacity exhibits almost a quadratic trajectory and is 
close to surpassing the capacity level of hydro. Both wind and bioenergies have been growing at 
virtually constant rates, but clearly the pace of the first has been faster.  
Figure 1 – RES-E generation 
 
Source: Terna (Italy’s transmission system operator). 
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Figure 2 – RES-E installed capacity 
 
Source: Terna 
2.2 RES-E support mechanisms 
Such an increase in RES-E generation materialised thanks to a variety of support schemes that were in 
operation. RES-E investment has been primarily incentivised through four generation-based 
mechanisms, namely “CIP 6/92”, “Certificati Verdi”, “Conto Energia” and “Tariffa 
Onnicomprensiva”.4 The first two are gradually being replaced by a tender system (Legislative Decree 
28/2011), the cost of which, however, still will be recovered through the A3. For this reason, and 
because our analysis has an ex-post perspective, it suffices to focus on the four mechanisms above. A 
brief review of them follows:5 
1. Introduced in 1992, CIP 6/92 (the acronym is from “Provision 6/1992 of the Inter-ministerial 
Committee on Prices”) is the first program for the direct promotion of RES-E generation. It is a 
feed-in tariff scheme that guarantees eligible generators a preset price for up to 15 years. 
Eligible are not exclusively RES-E generators. Generation from so-called “assimilated (to 
renewable) sources”, including co-generation, energy-from-waste and generation using fossil 
fuels from minor isolated deposits, is also incentivised. In fact, more than two thirds of the 
scheme’s cost is for the support of assimilated sources. The scheme is being phased out, as no 
new contracts are going to be issued and those still in effect will expire within few years. Its 
cost, which is determined by the difference between the guaranteed price and the wholesale 
market price, is recovered through the A3. 
2. Certificati Verdi, in force since 1999, is a tradable green certificates scheme whereby 
conventional generators are obliged to surrender certificates of renewable electricity (originally 
issued in exchange for RES-E generation) in proportion to production. For conventional 
generators, the certificates represent an additional cost, part of which may be absorbed and the 
remainder adds to the supply price. Therefore, the impact of green certificates on final 
consumers is filtered by the wholesale market, first, and the retail market, then. In the last few 
years, however, because of the recession, the market of green certificates has exhibited a 
                                                     
4 Public funds granted to RES-E promotion, as investment contributions and tax expenditures (i.e., reductions in tax 
revenues due to preferential tax treatment), are not negligible, but very difficult to quantify. Different government levels 
are involved (European, national, regional, local) and, with reference to tax expenditures, no information is usually 
available on the number of those who took advantage of the benefit nor could this number be plausibly estimated. 
5 For a detailed description of energy law in Italy, see Di Porto (2011). For a guide to the most recent legislation on RES-E 
support, see APER (2012a; 2012b). 
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persistent excess of supply. Unsold certificates are purchased by Gestore dei Servizi Energetici 
(GSE) and that cost is subsequently recovered through the A3.6 As a result, in recent years the 
scheme has weighed for the most part on the A3. Certificati Verdi is coming to a close end too: 
as of 2013, no more certificates are issued and those still valid will expire by 2015. 
3. Conto Energia is a feed-in tariff scheme exclusive to photovoltaics. It guarantees photovoltaic 
generators a fixed tariff for 20 years. The scheme has undergone several adjustments over the 
years, from “Conto Energia I”, in 2005, to “Conto Energia V”, in 2012. The cost of the scheme, 
which escalated in 2011 as a result of generous incentives and massive investment, is recovered 
through the A3. Conto Energia V set a €6.7b cap on the future annual cumulative cost of the 
scheme, which was reached in June 2013. As of then, new installations receive no feed-in tariff.   
4. Tariffa Onnicomprensiva is a more recent feed-in tariff scheme, only for relatively small non-
photovoltaic installations (less than 1 MW as a general rule, less than 200 KW only for wind). 
Eligible generators can choose between Tariffa Onnicomprensiva and Certificati Verdi. The 
cost of the scheme is recovered through the A3. 
With reference to 2011, Table 1 shows the breakdown of incentivised RES-E generation, by 
technology and scheme. Across technologies, the Certificati Verdi scheme covers two thirds of 
incentivised RES-E generation. Across schemes, one third is from hydro, while photovoltaics, wind 
and bioenergies represent about 20% each. 
Table 1 – Incentivised RES-E generation by technology and support mechanism, in 2011; GWh 
  
Certificati 
Verdi 
Conto 
Energia 
Tariffa 
Onnic. CIP 6/92 Total 
Share 
(techn.) 
Hydro 15,298.2 - 664.4 11.1 15,973.6 0.33 
Photovoltaic 3.5 10,411.3 - - 10,414.8 0.21 
Wind 9,178.5 - 4.4 465.0 9,647.9 0.20 
Bioenergies 4,623.8 - 1,873.7 3,114.0 9,611.5 0.20 
Geothermal 3,374.0 - - - 3,374.0 0.07 
Total 32,478.0 10,411.3 2,542.4 3,590.1 49,021.8 1.0 
Share (scheme) 0.66 0.21 0.05 0.07 1.0 
 Source: GSE (2012). 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of costs (upper chart) and generation levels (lower chart), under the four 
schemes, over the period 2008-2012. The development of photovoltaics, both in generation and cost, 
again catches the eye.7  
  
                                                     
6 The certificates in excess are bought by GSE, the following year, at a price determined as the sum of the annual average 
wholesale electricity price and a premium. The latter depends inversely on the former. 
7 For Certificati Verdi, a cost-to-generation ratio based on this chart cannot be deduced as certificates issued at a given 
time are valid for three years thereafter. 
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Figure 3 – Cost of support mechanisms (upper chart) and RES-E generation (lower chart) 
 
Note: The values for CIP 6/92 only refer to RES (assimilated sources are not considered); 2012 values are 
estimates. 
Source: AEEG (2012a). 
Table 2 reports the costs breakdown of RES-E support (excluding public funds and tax benefits) for 
2011 as well as the corresponding estimates for the year after. Total costs are €7,337m and €10,002m, 
respectively. Of these costs, €6,637m and €9,252m (90% and 92%), in that order, are paid through the 
A3.8 Moreover, under the Certificati Verdi scheme, €1,352m and €1,790m correspond to unsold green 
certificates (weighing on the A3), while traded certificates amount to €700m and €750m. 
  
                                                     
8 The cost of CIP 6/92 incentives to assimilated sources, equally recovered through the A3 (but not qualifying as 
renewable), are €1,299m and €1,394m for 2011 and 2012, respectively. 
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Table 2 – Cost of RES-E support mechanisms; €m 
RES-E support mechanisms 2011 2012 
CIP 6/92 567 555 
Certificati Verdi – Unsold cert’s 1,352 1,790 
Conto Energia 3,949 5,890 
Tariffa Onnicomprensiva 464 603 
Other 305 414 
Total A3 (a) 6,637 9,252 
Certificati Verdi – Negotiated cert’s (b) 700 750 
Total RES-E support mech. (a+b) 7,337 10,002 
Note: The values for CIP 6/92 only refer to RES (assimilated sources are not considered); 2012 values are 
estimates. 
Source: AEEG (2012b). 
3. Cost recovery of RES-E support mechanisms 
3.1 Household electricity prices 
In 2004, the Italian electricity market was liberalised for medium- and high voltage users. Since 2007, 
low voltage users, including residential users (households), can choose whether to switch to the open 
market or stay in the regulated market. By 2012, about 20% of households had switched to the open 
market.  
Retail electricity prices have three main components: a) the sale price of energy, b) tariffs, covering 
the costs of network- and system services, and c) taxes. Prices paid by households in the open market, 
PO, only differ from those of the regulated market, PR, with respect to the first component: in the open 
market, the price of energy is set by individual providers; in the regulated market, it is set by the 
market regulator.9 Both tariffs and taxes are applied in the two markets without distinction. The three 
components, however, vary across different dimensions. With regard to residential users, they vary 
depending on the type of user (h=1,2), the level of annual consumption (c = 1,2,3,4) and the hour 
band of consumption (t=1,2). Specifically, 
 
Taxes
hc
Tariffs
hchc
energyofice
SO
hc VATETSSNSPP ++++=
Pr
 
[1] 
 
Taxes
hc
Tariffs
hchc
energyofice
AU
hct
R
hct VATETSSNSPP ++++=
Pr
 
[2] 
where: PS is the price of energy demanded by supplier S in the open market; PAU is the price of energy 
set by the regulator (the superscript reminds that the price is tied to procurement costs incurred by 
Acquirente Unico in the wholesale market); NS and SS are network services (transmission, distribution 
                                                     
9 The electricity sold in the regulated market is first purchased on the wholesale market by Acquirente Unico (Single 
Buyer), a publicly owned company. In the regulated market, the price of energy is tied to procurement costs incurred by 
Acquirente Unico, which are fully recovered. 
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and metering) and system services, respectively; ET and VAT are excise tax and value added tax 
(10%), respectively.10 
Zooming in on the bimodal classification of residential users, relevant for our analysis, two 
parameters are considered: a) whether the dwelling is the place of residence of the account holder; b) 
whether the committed power capacity is greater than 3 KW. If the dwelling is not the place of 
residence of the account holder, the user is classified as “D3”, regardless of the committed power 
capacity level. Conversely, if it is the place of residence and, also, the committed power capacity is not 
greater than 3 KW, the user is classified as “D2”. That is, 
 



∪>=
∩≤=
residenceofplacenotKWifD
residenceofplaceKWifD
h
3"3"
3"2"
 
[3] 
3.2 The reflection of RES-E support in retail prices 
The progressive expansion of the cost of RES-E support is visible in the changing composition of 
retail prices. Every three months, the market regulator publishes the breakdown of the price paid by 
the representative residential user in the regulated market (as per [2]), identified as a “D2” with 2,700 
KWh annual consumption. Figure 4 assembles these figures from 2008 to 2013. Table 3 contrasts 
prices in the first quarters of 2008 and 2013. The relative weight of system services, 90% of which has 
come to be represented by the A3, almost doubled between 2008 and 2013: from 9.9% to 18%. 
Figure 4 – Composition of electricity price paid by the representative residential user, 2008-2013 
 
Source: AEEG. 
  
                                                     
10 In [1] and [2], the VAT yield is additive, but the VAT rate is applied to (multiplied by) all other elements of the equation.  
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Table 3 – Price paid by the representative residential user: 2008 Q1 vs 2013 Q1 
  2008 Q1 2013 Q1 
Component c€/KWh % c€/KWh % 
Energy (procurem. and sale) 10.16 61.6% 10.38 54.3% 
Network Services 2.39 14.5% 2.77 14.5% 
System Services 1.63 9.9% 3.44 18.0% 
Taxes 2.33 14.1% 2.55 13.3% 
Total 16.51 100.0% 19.13 100.0% 
Source: AEEG. 
Greater RES-E generation means that the overall cost of the connected support schemes rises, as is 
reflected by the swelling of the A3 over time. This explains the difference in the cost of system 
services between 2008 and 2013. At the same time, however, as the variable cost of RES-E generation 
is virtually nil, greater penetration of renewable electricity should lower wholesale prices – what is 
technically known as merit-order effect. As a result, the net impact on retail prices is intended to be 
smaller than the A3 itself.11 It is the case that the wholesale price, Prezzo Unico Nazionale (National 
Single Price), in the first quarter of 2013 was 20% lower than it was in the first quarter of 2008 (Figure 
5).12 However, without a model of the market it is not possible to tell how much of this difference can 
be attributed to the greater share of renewable electricity in the generation mix. 
Figure 5 – Electricity wholesale price (Prezzo Unico Nazionale), 2005-2013 
 
Source: AEEG. 
3.3 The structure of the A3 
Different rates of the A3 are applied across user categories and consumption levels. They are regularly 
revised (usually every three months) by the market regulator, Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas 
(AEEG), in function of the costs that need to be recovered. As a result of the surge in RES-E 
                                                     
11 Lehr et al. [2012] and Cludius et al. [2013] estimate the net cost of the surcharge for German consumers.  
12 The National Single Price is the weighted average of zonal prices in the day-ahead market. Not to be confused with PAU, 
in [2], though to some extent the second should reflect the first.  
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investment, of photovoltaics in the first place, these rates have grown by more than a hundredfold 
between 2008 and 2013. 
Tables 4 and 5 report the rates of the A3 applied to residential and industry users, respectively, in 
the first quarter of 2008. The A3 was then still very modest and virtually uniform across users. The 
same rate, c€0.03/KWh, was applied to all levels of household consumption as well as to industry 
monthly consumption below 8 GWh. The two exceptions to the rule were: a) monthly consumption 
above 8 GWh, of medium-, high- and very high voltage users, was tariff-exempt; b) a slightly higher 
rate, c€0.04/KWh, was applied to all consumption of low voltage non-residential users (with more 
than 1.5 KW committed power capacity). 
Table 4 – A3 rates for residential users, in 2008 Q1 
 
Annual consumption (KWh) 
User type < 1800 1800 - 2640 > 2640 
D2 0.030 0.030 0.030 
D3 0.030 0.030 0.030 
Source: AEEG. 
Table 5 – A3 rates for industry users, in 2008 Q1 
 Monthly consumption (GWh) 
Voltage < 4 4 - 8 8 - 12 > 12 
Low (< 1.5KW) 0.03 - - - 
Low (> 1.5KW) 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Medium 0.03 0.03 0 0 
High, Very High 0.03 0.03 0 0 
Source: AEEG. 
Thereafter, all rates have been progressively raised and differentiated at the same time. Tables 6 and 7 
show what they looked like five years later, in the first quarter of 2013. For D2 residential users, three 
consumption brackets are applied different rates. Specifically, c€2.346, c€3.522 and c€5.102 per KWh 
apply to annual consumption, respectively, below 1,800 KWh, between 1,800 and 2,640 KWh, and 
above 2,640 KWh. For D3 residential users, a single rate exists, which is also the highest, 
c€5.102/KWh. Turning to producers, low voltage users remain the most penalised (c€4.745/KWh is 
applied to all consumption), while lower rates and exemptions (above 8- or 12 GWh monthly 
consumption) apply to consumption of medium-, high- and very high voltage users. 
Table 6 – A3 rates for residential users, in 2013 Q1 
 
Annual consumption (KWh) 
User type < 1800 1800 - 2640 > 2640 
D2 2.346 3.522 5.102 
D3 5.102 5.102 5.102 
Source: AEEG. 
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Table 7 – A3 rates for industry users, in 2013 Q1 
 Monthly consumption (GWh) 
Voltage < 4 4 - 8 8 - 12 > 12 
Low (< 1.5KW) 3.475 - - - 
Low (> 1.5KW) 4.745 4.745 4.745 4.745 
Medium 3.896 3.896 0 0 
High, Very High 3.924 1.962 1.962 0 
Source: AEEG. 
The magnitude of these rates is notable if compared to the wholesale electricity price, which in the 
first quarter of 2013 averaged c€6.4/KWh (Figure 5). As the rates are so high and diverse, the ensuing 
distributional effects, across households and firms, are non-negligible. Table 8 shows the distribution 
of residential users by market (regulated, open) and level of the A3 (low, medium, high), in 2011.13 
More than half of all residential users (52%) pay the highest rate. Among these, there are both D2 
users with annual consumption exceeding 2,640 KWh and D3 users (with any consumption level). 
Table 8 – Distribution of residential users by market and A3 level; thousand 
 A3 rate level   
Market Low Medium High Total Share 
Regulated 7,156.7 4,581.1 12,278.1 24,015.9 83.3% 
Open 1,044.6 1,058.6 2,710.2 4,813.4 16.7% 
Total 8,201.3 5,639.7 14,988.3 28,829.3  
Share 28.4% 19.6% 52.0%  100.0% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on AEEG data. 
As regards non-residential users, the tariff structure is advantageous to big electricity consumers and 
disadvantageous to small or relatively small ones (Table 7). Thus, while the rates applied to residential 
users somehow reflect the principle of progressiveness, those applied to non-residential users were set 
to safeguard the competitiveness of the largest electricity consuming industries. In this regard, 
however, a recent ministerial decree ordained that these rates must be revised according to industries’ 
electricity intensity (relative to turnover) and not just on the basis of consumption level.14 
3.4 The “Bonus Elettrico” (Social Bonus) 
The most vulnerable in society to rising energy bills are usually helped through specific income 
supplements. Depending on how well-targeted they are, these compensatory measures more or less 
effectively adjust the distributional impact of electricity price rises. In Italy, the “Bonus Elettrico” 
(Social Bonus) is a program, in place since 2008, for aiding indigent households and those dependent 
on electrical medical equipment covering the cost of electricity consumption. The amount of the 
Bonus depends on the size of the household and is meant to represent about 20% of the expected 
annual electricity expenditure. All electricity consumers, except the beneficiaries, pay a specific 
surcharge for recovering the cost of the program. This, cumulated over the period 2008-2012, has been 
                                                     
13 For the open market, only the distribution of consumption is available. We thus assumed that the proportions of D2 and 
D3 users were the same as in the regulated market (for which information is available).  
14 The decree was issued in conjunction by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Economic 
Development, on April 5th 2013. 
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estimated to amount about €300m. About two million households have received the Bonus at least 
once since its introduction and about 950,000 households received it in 2012 (AEEG [2013]).  
4. Distributional incidence: A3 vs carbon tax 
In this section, we estimate the incidence of the A3 (c€/KWh) across income distribution and compare 
it to that of a carbon tax (€/tCO2) as a potential alternative for recovering the cost of RES-E support. 
The primary aim is to determine whether, and to what extent, a carbon tax would be less regressive 
than the A3. The tax envisaged applies to all CO2 emissions. It is thus equivalent to one that only 
applies to the non-EU ETS sector and perfectly matches the carbon price in the EU ETS sector – a 
uniform price on all emissions is the first-best option for emission abatement. In general, a carbon tax 
“directly” impacts on CO2-related energy prices, including electricity prices, and “indirectly” on all 
other prices. In comparing the carbon tax to the A3, we only consider the direct impact.15 The carbon 
tax we derive is such that a) applied to CO2 emissions from household consumption of motor fuels, 
electricity, gas and other home fuels, and b) assuming perfectly inelastic demand, it generates a yield 
equal to the estimated cost of the A3 for the same households.16 This allows us to compare the carbon 
tax and the A3 with respect to distributional incidence. Furthermore, as Italy’s territory is 
characterised by significant economic and climatic variation, the analysis is first carried out for the 
country as a whole and, then, for three macro-regions – Northern, Central and Southern Italy. 
The fundamental difference between the carbon tax and the A3 is in the base. The first hits all 
forms of CO2-related energy, while the second only concerns electricity consumption. Thus, to the 
extent that energy is a less necessary good than electricity, the carbon tax will be less regressive than 
the A3. Indeed, we expect this to be the case, as the demand for home fuels is typically less income 
elastic than the demand for motor fuels; and, in line with this, we usually observe that motor fuel 
consumption more closely follows income, across income distribution, than electricity consumption 
does. It is understood that this has to do with the number and the engine size of vehicles owned by 
richer households. 
4.1 Data and methodology 
Every year, the Italian statistical office (Istituto Nazionale di Statistica) conducts a household survey 
called “Indagine sui consumi delle famiglie” (ICF). The survey records monthly expenditures as well 
as information on socio-demographic characteristics and other variables. We use the most recent round 
presently available, which refers to 2011 and has a sample of 23,158 households (ISTAT [2013]).17 
Unfortunately, the ICF does not report information on quantities consumed.18 The data, however, are 
sufficiently detailed with respect to the goods purchased. This is true also for energy items, which is 
what we focus on. Where suitable averages of consumer prices are available (from external sources), 
we are thus able to estimate quantities by dividing expenditures by the relative price averages. In our 
application, the energy commodities for which consumer price averages were available are electricity, 
natural gas, home heating diesel, petrol and transport diesel. The respective values are reported in 
Table A1, in the Appendix. 
                                                     
15 The direct impact is more significant in terms of magnitude. It is also easier to estimate. To estimate the indirect impact, 
the carbon content of final products needs to be determined. This is typically done using input-output data in combination 
with emissions data (e.g., Verde and Tol [2009], Wier et al. [2005]). 
16 The equivalence in yield is limited to the household sector. To impose the equivalence in total yield, an economy-wide 
model is needed. 
17 In 2011, Italy’s household population was 25,165,002. 
18 We urge ISTAT to introduce quantities of energy commodities in the ICF. This would enhance both scope and quality of 
empirical studies dealing with household energy consumption. 
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We carry out distributional (incidence) analysis based on consumption patterns across income 
distribution. As the survey does not report information on household disposable income, we use total 
expenditure as a proxy.19 The sample is partitioned by adult-equivalised total expenditure decile so as 
to take differences both in households’ size and composition into account.20 Besides, sample weights 
are applied throughout, which means that the total expenditure deciles as well as the relative statistics 
represent population parameters.  
For each household, the cost of the A3 is given by the product of electricity consumption and the 
relative rates. As the ICF refers to 2011, we apply the A3 rates in force at the time. These were already 
relevant in magnitude (Table 9), but are substantially lower than current ones (Table 6).  
Table 9 – A3 rates for residential users, in 2011 
 
 
Annual consumption (KWh) 
Quarter User type < 1800 1800 - 2640 > 2640 
Q1 
D2 0.491 0.736 1.006 
D3 1.006 1.006 1.006 
Q2 
D2 0.965 1.447 2.097 
D3 2.097 2.097 2.097 
Q3 
D2 1.162 1.743 2.526 
D3 2.526 2.526 2.526 
Q4 
D2 1.262 1.893 2.744 
D3 2.744 2.744 2.744 
Source: AEEG. 
The results below are, therefore, specific to 2011. The main purpose of this application, however, is to 
assess the difference in distributional incidence between the A3 and the carbon tax. In that respect, the 
conclusions are valid not just in relation to that specific year, but in a more general sense. 
Furthermore, for each household, the ICF only allows us to estimate – and not to derive without error 
– the cost of the A3. There are two reasons for this. First, information on electricity consumption 
(quantity) is not given. We thus estimate it by dividing expenditure by a suitable price average. 
Second, after estimating monthly consumption, we need to estimate annual consumption. This is 
because different A3 rates apply to different brackets of annual consumption. We then have to 
extrapolate each household’s annual consumption based on the pattern of average monthly 
consumption (estimated).21  
The estimates we worked out are largely consistent with aggregate statistics on household 
electricity consumption. Figure 6 shows the distribution of annual electricity consumption obtained 
with the procedure just described. The median, 2,606 KWh, is very close to 2,700 KWh, which is the 
consumption of the representative household (in the regulated market) indicated by the market 
regulator (AEEG). The distribution of households by A3 rate (Table 10) is also in line with the actual 
one (Table 8). 
                                                     
19 This was an obligated choice. However, it is often presented as a preferable option, by the arguments of a) total 
expenditure being a better measure of permanent income, and b) income underreporting in household surveys. 
20 We use the new OECD equivalence scale, whereby the head of household weighs 1, all other household members aged 
14 or older weigh 0.5 each, and those younger than 14 weigh 0.3 each. Adult-equivalised total expenditure is then 
obtained by dividing total household expenditure by the sum of equivalised adults. 
21 As the pattern differed somewhat for households with air conditioning equipment, we derived one separately for that 
subsample. 
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Figure 6 – Distribution of households by annual electricity consumption. 
  
Table 10 – Distribution of households by A3 level and tot. expend. decile. 
 A3 rate level  
Decile Low Medium High Total 
1st 32.5% 23.2% 44.3% 100% 
2nd 28.0% 22.5% 49.5% 100% 
3rd  26.5% 24.2% 49.4% 100% 
4th 27.9% 22.9% 49.2% 100% 
5th 24.1% 23.6% 52.3% 100% 
6th 25.0% 23.0% 52.0% 100% 
7th 26.4% 22.6% 51.0% 100% 
8th 25.1% 22.5% 52.4% 100% 
9th 25.1% 18.6% 56.3% 100% 
10th 23.1% 13.8% 63.1% 100% 
All pop. 26.4% 21.7% 51.9% 100% 
If we sum and gross-up estimated consumption to derive overall consumption of the household sector, 
in 2011, we get 83,900 GWh, which is 19% above the actual amount, 70,140 GWh. Some discrepancy 
between monthly survey data and annual aggregate data is normal. However, the main reasons why 
overall consumption is here overestimated are: a) the ICF does not tell us whether the given household 
is a D2 or a D3 user nor whether it buys electricity in the regulated market or in the open market;22 b) 
we only had information on average quarterly prices for D2 users, in the regulated market. We thus 
had no alternative but to apply D2 average prices to all electricity expenditures, even though D3 users 
generally pay higher prices. Moreover, in 2011, average retail prices were about 20% higher in the 
open market than in the regulated market (AEEG [2012c]). 
                                                     
22 The only useful distinction is between first and second homes.  
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The higher (electricity consumption and, thus) the yield of the A3 is, the higher the equivalent 
carbon tax is. The rate of the carbon tax is determined by dividing the overall yield of the A3 
(estimated) by the overall amount of CO2 emissions (estimated), both limited to the household sector. 
In asserting the equivalence in yield, between the A3 and the carbon tax, the implicit assumption is 
that household energy demand is unresponsive to the second, which is a reasonable assumption only 
for the very short term. Emissions embedded in energy consumption are obtained by multiplying the 
estimated quantities of fuels and electricity by the respective emission factors (Table A2). 
4.2 Results: whole country 
The carbon tax rate, equivalent to the A3 in the sense previously specified, turned out to be €8.6/tCO2. 
We then multiplied this rate by each household’s emissions to work out the cost of the tax for each of 
those. As Figure 7 shows, average costs both of the A3 and of the carbon tax increase monotonically 
across income distribution.23 The pattern of the first, however, is flatter. The average monthly cost of 
the A3 is slightly less than €2 per adult equivalent (€/month/adult-eq), for the first decile, and about 
€3.5 for the tenth decile. The average cost of the carbon tax, instead, ranges between €1 and almost 
€4.5/month/adult-eq. 
Figure 7 – A3 vs carbon tax: cost (average), by tot. expend. decile. 
 
We compared these costs to total expenditure in order to better appreciate the magnitude of the effects 
and assess the incidence of the two instruments. As Figure 8 shows, on average, the cost of the A3 
represents slightly more than 0.35% of total expenditure, for the first decile, and slightly less than 
0.1%, for the tenth decile. By contrast, the cost of the carbon tax represents 0.2% of total expenditure, 
for the first decile, and little more than 0.1% for the tenth decile. Therefore, the first-to-tenth decile 
ratios are slightly above 3.5 and 2, for the A3 and the carbon tax, respectively. This means that the 
first is significantly more regressive than the second.  
                                                     
23 The distribution is, in fact, of adult-equivalised total expenditure. 
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Figure 8 – A3 vs carbon tax: share of tot. expend. (average), by tot. expend. decile. 
 
A limitation of this way (standard) of assessing regressiveness is that it ignores intra-group (in this 
case, intra-decile) variation. We therefore reproduced the charts in Figures 7 and 8 but replaced the 
bars with box plots marking the first, second and third quartiles (Q1, Q2 and Q3) and the adjacent 
values of the distributions.24 It is apparent, in Figures 9 and 10, that the incidence of the carbon tax is 
less variable than that of the A3. This is a second important point in favour of the former, as it implies 
a more even – not only less regressive – distribution of the cost. Table 11 reports the coefficient of 
variation, by decile, both for the A3 and the carbon tax. 
  
                                                     
24 The adjacent values are defined as the lowest and highest observations that are still inside the region defined by the 
following limits (lower and upper limit, respectively): a) Q1-1.5∙IQR and b) Q3+1.5∙IQR, where IQR is the interquartile 
range, Q3-Q1. 
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Figure 9 – A3 vs carbon tax: distribution of cost, by tot. expend. decile 
 
Figure 10 – A3 vs carbon tax: distribution of share of tot. expend., by tot. expend. decile 
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Table 11 – A3 vs carbon tax: coeff. of variation of cost and share of tot. expend., by tot. expend. 
decile 
 
Cost, € 
CV 
Prop. of tot. expend., % 
CV 
Decile A3 CT A3 CT 
1 0.86 0.64 0.86 0.60 
2 0.89 0.57 0.89 0.56 
3 0.81 0.55 0.81 0.55 
4 0.87 0.56 0.87 0.56 
5 0.90 0.54 0.90 0.54 
6 0.91 0.54 0.90 0.54 
7 0.93 0.56 0.93 0.56 
8 0.95 0.56 0.96 0.56 
9 0.97 0.56 0.97 0.56 
10 1.08 0.65 1.05 0.67 
4.3 Results: macro-regions 
Economic and climatic differences between Italy’s northern and southern regions suggest that the 
distributional incidence both of the A3 and the carbon tax may vary significantly within the country. 
We thus considered three macro-regions, namely Northern, Central and Southern Italy, and, for each 
of these, we replicated the analysis illustrated in the previous paragraph. The only difference is that the 
equivalence in yield, between the A3 and the carbon tax, still holds at the national level and not 
necessarily (in fact, very possibly) at the macro-regional level. This reflects the idea that the A3 and 
the carbon tax is and would be, respectively, uniform across the country. 
Table 12 reports the deciles of total expenditure (adult equivalised) derived for the three macro-
regions. Income distributions of Northern and Southern Italy stand at opposite ends, while Central 
Italy lies in between. 
Table 12 – Distribution of total expenditure, by macro-region; €/month/adult-eq. 
Decile North Centre South 
1 < 831 < 763 < 525 
2 831 – 1,040 763 – 948 525 – 649 
3 1,040 – 1,208 948 – 1,111 649 – 754 
4 1,208 – 1,382 1,111 – 1,255 754 – 867 
5 1,382 – 1,557 1,255 – 1,413 867 – 982 
6 1,557 – 1,766 1,413 – 1,605 982 – 1,115 
7 1,766 – 2,050 1,605 – 1,861 1,115 – 1,279 
8 2,050 – 2,425 1,861 – 2,127 1,279 – 1,505 
9 2,425 – 3,145 2,127 – 2,659 1,505 – 1,925 
10 > 3,145 > 2,659 > 1,925 
Both level and composition of energy expenditure significantly vary by macro-region too. Again, the 
biggest differences are between northern and southern regions, as Figure 11 shows. Energy 
expenditure largely follows income. It is highest in Northern Italy and clearly lower in Southern Italy. 
More surprisingly, perhaps, the composition of energy expenditure is quite different as well. In 
particular, substantially higher gas expenditure in Northern Italy, compared to Central and especially 
Southern Italy, suggests home heating weighs significantly more on households located in northern 
regions. By contrast, the levels both of motor fuel expenditure and electricity expenditure are 
comparable across regions. 
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Figure 11 – Energy expenditure (average), by total expenditure decile and macro-region  
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The differences just highlighted, in income distribution and expenditure patterns, underlie those in the 
incidence of the A3 and the carbon tax, as depicted in Figures 12 and 13. In Northern Italy, it emerges 
from Figure 12, the carbon tax is on average more onerous than the A3 across all income distribution 
but for the poorest decile. Exactly the opposite is true for Southern Italy, principally because of lower 
gas consumption, while Central Italy again exhibits an intermediate profile. 
  
Cost recovery of RES-E support in Italy: A new case for a carbon tax 
21 
Figure 12 – A3 vs carbon tax: cost (average), by tot. expend. decile and macro-region 
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By expressing costs as proportions of total expenditure, we can compare burdens both within and 
between income distributions of the three populations. The A3 is generally more regressive than the 
carbon tax, but to a much greater extent in Southern Italy than in the rest of the country. The 
difference in distributional incidence, between the A3 and the carbon tax, indeed appears small both in 
Central and Northern Italy. Moreover, not only the carbon tax is generally less regressive than the A3 
(especially in Southern Italy), but the burden it places is also much more homogeneous across the 
three macro-regions. In all of these, it ranges between 0.2% and 0.1%, for the poorest and the richest 
deciles, respectively. While income in Southern Italy is lower than in the other regions, electricity 
consumption is not lower in the same proportion. This is why the A3 is particularly penalising for the 
South. By contrast, gas consumption in Southern Italy is substantially lower than in the other regions. 
Because the carbon tax hits all fossil fuels, this makes up for the difference in income with the other 
regions. 
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Figure 13 – A3 vs carbon tax: share of tot. exp. (average), by tot. exp. decile and macro-region 
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In principle, assuming no solidarity among regions, Northern regions would prefer the A3 because it 
would cost them less (though its incidence is slightly more regressive than that of the carbon tax). This 
is because equality in yield between the A3 and the carbon tax is made to hold at the national level and 
Southern regions contribute more to the A3 than they do to the carbon tax total yield. As southern 
regions are poorer than the others, this result still is consistent with the argument that a carbon tax is 
less regressive than an electricity surcharge because energy is a less necessary good than electricity. It 
shows, however, how the application of the instruments in question can have different implications at 
the regional level.  
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the incidence, across income distribution, of the electricity surcharge used for 
recovering the cost of RES-E support in Italy. Following massive RES-E investment, primarily in 
photovoltaics, the surcharge in question, named A3, has gone up by more than a hundredfold between 
2008 and 2013 and has come to represent about 17% of the price paid by the average household. What 
justifies RES-E support is a set of public policy objectives, including environmental protection, 
technology innovation, energy security and employment. Thus, in principle, its cost should be covered 
by the government budget. That RES-E support is instead funded by a surcharge on electricity 
consumption is questionable because of the regressiveness of such a system. Electricity is indeed a 
necessity good par excellence. The problem arises not just for Italy, but for most European countries, 
where RES-E support is funded in analogous ways. 
We thus consider a carbon tax as a means for recovering the cost of RES-E support alternative to 
the A3. The tax applies to all CO2 emissions and can be thought of as an extension of the carbon price 
to the non-EU ETS sector. A uniform price on all emission is recommended on the ground of cost-
effectiveness in emission abatement, but – we argue – it would also make for greater equity if the 
proceeds were used in substitution of the A3. The fundamental difference between the A3 and the 
carbon tax is in the base: it is electricity in the former’s case and (all fossil fuels, hence) all forms of 
CO2-related energy in the latter’s. The evidence of many studies (demand elasticities and consumption 
patterns) suggests that energy is a less necessary good than electricity; typically because motor fuel 
consumption more closely follows income than electricity consumption does. This is why a carbon tax 
would be less regressive than the A3.  
Our empirical investigation, based on household survey data, confirmed this postulation. Not only 
that, the cost of the carbon tax would be more evenly distributed, which is a consequence of the fact 
that the base is diversified (unlike with the A3). Furthermore, differences in wealth and climatic 
conditions (thereby in energy use) determine regional differences in the impacts, measured as 
proportions of total expenditure, of the A3 much more than of the carbon tax. The impact of the A3 is 
about twice as big for southern regions compared to northern ones. By contrast, given lower gas 
consumption in the South, the carbon tax would impact similarly across the country. This can be 
regarded as a coincidence (it just so happens that gas consumption is lower in the South), but again it 
can only arise because the base of the carbon tax is diversified. 
The reform we advocate a) has no cost (it shifts a burden, it does not add a new one), b) is for 
achieving greater equity (as well as cost-effectiveness) and c) involves tax earmarking. Taken 
together, these three elements should help making it accepted by the public. As a carbon tax would be 
more visible to the consumer than the A3 is, the replacement of the second with the first should be 
made equally visible. Strong empirical evidence confirms that earmarking the revenues from 
environmental taxes increases their popularity (e.g., Kallbekken et al. [2011], Kallbekken and Sælen 
[2011], Hsu et al. [2008], Dresner et al. [2006]). Furthermore, some accompanying measures would be 
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needed. Motor fuels, in Italy, are already heavily taxed, well above the European average.25 A 
€20/tCO2 carbon tax would only raise the price of petrol by about 4.5 cents/litre (5 cents for diesel),26 
but some discontent is easy to imagine. This could be overcome by reordering the existing set of 
energy taxes. Indeed, the system of excise taxes, across fuels and uses, has developed over the years in 
function of revenue needs and not for achieving cost-effective reductions in CO2 emission. As a result, 
there is sufficient space for restructuring of excise taxes for accommodating a carbon tax on motor 
fuels while not raising prices by the same amount (OECD [2013]). 
Finally, our empirical analysis is both static and limited to the household sector. This suffices for 
the purpose of showing the fundamental difference in distributional incidence between an electricity 
surcharge and a carbon tax. However, to give more precise indications about the proposed reform 
(beginning with the level of the carbon tax equivalent to the surcharge) and to take the effects on the 
rest of the economy into account, an economy-wide model would be needed. It is our intention to 
extend the study in this direction.  
 
  
                                                     
25 In 2012, the price of diesel was 28% higher than the average for the twelve MS of the original Euro area. As for petrol, 
the price was 12% higher. (Source: Eurostat) 
26 A €20/tCO2 carbon tax means 2 cents per kilogram of CO2 (c€2/KgCO2). As the emission factor of petrol is 
approximately 2.33 KgCO2/litre (see Table A2, in the Appendix), a €20/tCO2 carbon tax translates in an excise tax of 
c€4.66/litre. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 – Average fuel consumer prices, 2011 
 Home fuels Motor fuels 
Month Electricity 
 €/KWh 
Gas  
€/m3 
Diesel 
€/litre 
Petrol 
€/litre 
Diesel 
€/litre 
1 
0.1557 0.7500 
1.27 1.45 1.32 
2 1.29 1.46 1.35 
3 1.36 1.52 1.41 
4 
0.1618 0.7652 
1.37 1.54 1.44 
5 1.34 1.54 1.42 
6 1.33 1.52 1.40 
7 
0.1649 0.7970 
1.35 1.57 1.45 
8 1.35 1.58 1.46 
9 1.36 1.58 1.46 
10 
0.1649 0.8407 
1.37 1.59 1.48 
11 1.40 1.59 1.51 
12 1.40 1.65 1.63 
Source: Electricity and gas prices are from AEEG. Diesel and petrol prices are from the Ministry of Economic 
Development.  
Table A2 – Emission factors, 2011 
 
Home fuels Motor fuels 
Electricity 
KgCO2/KWh 
Gas 
KgCO2/m3 
Diesel 
KgCO2/litre 
Petrol 
KgCO2/litre 
Diesel 
KgCO2/litre 
Factor 0.38 1.96 2.59 2.33 2.58 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ISPRA data (Istituto Superiore per la Protezione e la Ricerca 
Ambientale). 
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